UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-12-2020

State v. Marshall Respondent's Brief Dckt. 46937

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Marshall Respondent's Brief Dckt. 46937" (2020). Not Reported. 6075.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6075

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
5/12/2020 11:29 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 46937-2019
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Canyon County Case No.
v.
) CR14-18-3848
)
TORY JONATHON MARSHALL,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE DAVIS F. VANDERVELDE
District Judge
________________________

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
COLLEEN D. ZAHN
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.........................................................................................................1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................................................1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ...................................................1
ISSUES ............................................................................................................................................4
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................5
I.

II.

Marshall’s Claim Regarding The PSI Is Moot Because The
District Court Made No Adverse Ruling From Which He
Can Appeal ...............................................................................................................5
A.

Introduction ..................................................................................................5

B.

The Court Made No Adverse Ruling With Respect
To The PSI From Which Marshall Can Appeal ...........................................5

C.

Alternatively, Marshall Has Failed To Show That
The District Court Erred With Respect To The
Proposed Correction To The PSI..................................................................6

Marshall Has Failed To Show That The District Court
Abused Its Sentencing Discretion ..........................................................................10
A.

Introduction ................................................................................................10

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................................................10

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing
Discretion ...................................................................................................10

i

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................................14

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Fodge v. State, 125 Idaho 882, 876 P.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1994) ........................................................ 9
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) ....................................................................................... 9
State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 854 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1993) .................................................. 9
State v. Carey, 152 Idaho 720, 274 P.3d 21 (2012) ......................................................................7, 8
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 170 P.3d 397 (2007) .............................................................10, 11
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 99 P.3d 1069 (2004)....................................................................... 5
State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 824 P.2d 109 (1991).................................................................. 6, 7
State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 231 P.3d 1047 (Ct. App. 2010) ................................................. 6, 7
State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 178 P.3d 658 (Ct. App. 2007) ....................................................... 6
State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 262, 971 P.2d 327 (1988)............................................................ 6, 7
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982) .....................................................11
STATUTES
I.C. § 19-2520F ............................................................................................................................... 2
OTHER AUTHORITIES
iCourt Portal, State v. Marshall, Canyon County District Court
Case No. CR14-18-03848 ................................................................................................. 13

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tory Jonathon Marshall appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury
trial verdicts finding him guilty of aiding and abetting burglary and aiding and abetting grand
theft.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In November 2017, Marshall was an inmate at the Canyon County Detention Center.
(PSI, p.4.) Jail staff located a property release form authorizing Paula Rush to pick up property
at the jail belonging to another inmate. (Id.) Staff approached the inmate who informed them
that he did not fill out the form and did not know who Rush was. (Id.) Video surveillance
revealed that Marshall completed the form. (Id.) Upon further investigation, jail staff identified
three occasions in November 2017 in which Rush entered the Canyon County Detention Center
and obtained the property of other inmates. (PSI, pp.4-5.) The investigation also revealed that
Marshall had communicated with Rush about these transactions, and instructed her on what to do
with the property obtained. (Id.)
The state charged Marshall with numerous felony offenses related to Rush’s acquisition
of inmate property. 1 (R., pp.45.) Marshall was bound over on 4 of the 5 felony charges (R.,

1

At the preliminary hearing in a previous case, CR-14-17-22736, the court dismissed the state’s
felony charges brought against Marshall. (See R., pp.45-46, 53-54, 57-58.) The state
subsequently refiled the dismissed charges in CR-14-18-03848. (See R., pp.45-46, 57-58.) The
court consolidated the refiled charges with a remaining misdemeanor charge from CR-14-1722736. (See R., pp.24-25, 45-46, 53-54, 57-58.)

1

pp.32-33, 41-44), but the state ultimately tried Marshall only on two felony charges, both related
to the theft of property belonging to inmate Augustin Amaral. (R., pp.124-126; see generally
Trial Tr.) After a trial, the jury found Marshall guilty on those two counts – aiding and abetting
burglary and aiding and abetting grand theft. (R., pp.136-138.)
At the sentencing hearing, the judge asked the parties if there were “corrections to be
made” to the PSI. (Sent. Tr. 2, p.34, Ls.18-23.) Marshall responded that while the “Victim’s
Statement” in the PSI referenced four victims, that there “should be one named victim and that is
Mr. Augustine Amaral.” (Sent. Tr., p.35, Ls.4-6; see also PSI, p.5.) The court stated, “[a]ll
right,” asked if there were additional corrections, and continued the sentencing hearing when
Marshall replied that there were none. (Sent. Tr., p.35, Ls.7-9.) According to the PSI that is a
part of the appellate record in this case, the court did not subsequently “redline” this information
in the PSI itself. (See PSI, p.5.)
The state recommended that the district court impose a unified 10-year sentence with
three years fixed for aiding and abetting burglary, and a consecutive five-year indeterminate
sentence for aiding and abetting grand theft, and to impose the sentence immediately. (Sent. Tr.,
p.45, Ls.8-13.) Marshall recommended that if the sentences must run consecutively, 3 the court
should impose a unified six-year sentence with three years fixed for aiding and abetting burglary,

2

Citations to the sentencing transcript refer to the page number of the sentencing transcript, and
not of the pdf document that contains all of the transcribed hearings.
3

Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520F, the district court was required to impose Marshall’s two sentences
consecutively with each other, and with other sentences Marshall was already serving, because
they were both felony offenses committed on the grounds of an Idaho correctional facility.
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and a three-year indeterminate sentence for aiding and abetting grand theft, and to suspend the
sentences and place Marshall on probation. (Sent. Tr., p.48, L.24 – p.49, L.12.) The district
court followed the state’s sentencing recommendation with respect to the determinate and
indeterminate terms of confinement, but retained jurisdiction for one year. (Sent. Tr., p.51, L.17
– p.52, L.3; R., pp.159-160.) Marshall timely appealed. (R., pp.161-164.)

3

ISSUES
Marshall states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to redline the part
of the PSI that defense counsel pointed out was erroneous?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it retained jurisdiction, but
imposed consecutive underlying sentences of ten years, with three years
fixed, and five years, with zero years fixed, following Mr. Marshall’s
convictions for one count of aiding and abetting burglary, and one count of
aiding and abetting grand theft?

(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Is Marshall’s claim regarding the PSI moot because the district court made no adverse
ruling from which he can appeal? Alternatively, has Marshall failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion with respect to the PSI?

2.

Has Marshall failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Marshall’s Claim Regarding The PSI Is Moot Because The District Court Made No Adverse
Ruling From Which He Can Appeal
A.

Introduction
Marshall contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to redline the

portion of the PSI that he challenged during the sentencing hearing. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)
However, because the court did not deny any request to so alter the PSI, there is no adverse
ruling from which Marshall can appeal. In any event, a review of the record reveals that even if
it were asked to do, the court had no duty to redline the challenged material because it did not
conclude that the material was erroneous or unreliable, and because the material was not, in fact,
erroneous or unreliable.

B.

The Court Made No Adverse Ruling With Respect To The PSI From Which Marshall Can
Appeal
To “raise an issue on appeal, the record must contain an adverse ruling to form the basis

for assignment of error.” State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 687, 99 P.3d 1069, 1077 (2004) (citation
omitted).
During the sentencing hearing in this case, the district court stated that it had received and
reviewed Marshall’s PSI. (Sent. Tr., p.34, Ls.18-19.) The court asked the parties, “[a]re there
corrections to be made?” (Sent. Tr., p.34, L.23.) Marshall responded that he had one correction:
“It’s on Page 5, under Victims. There should be one named victim and that is Mr. Augustine
Amaral.” (Sent. Tr., p.35, Ls.4-6.) The court responded, “[a]ll right. That was the only
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correction to be made, [counsel]?” (Sent. Tr., p.35, Ls.7-9.) Marshall’s counsel responded that it
was, and the court continued with the sentencing hearing. (Sent. Tr., p.35, L.9.)
Unlike State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 181-184, 824 P.2d 109, 112-115 (1991), and State
v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961-962, 231 P.3d 1047, 1058-1059 (Ct. App. 2010), in which Idaho
appellate courts remanded cases after district courts erroneously denied defendant requests to
strike information from PSIs, the district court in this case entered no such denial. Nor was it
even asked to strike or redline any information from the PSI. The court therefore made no
adverse ruling from which Marshall can appeal. 4
Because the court made no such adverse ruling, Marshall’s challenge regarding the PSI is
moot and should not be considered by this Court.

C.

Alternatively, Marshall Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred With Respect
To The Proposed Correction To The PSI
In the alternative, even if the district court’s statement at the sentencing hearing and

subsequent failure to redline the challenged information from the PSI constitute an adverse
ruling from which Marshall may appeal, Marshall has failed to show that the district court
abused its discretion. The PSI’s references to victims of alleged crimes for which Marshall was

4

Further, assuming that Marshall’s proposed “correction” to the PSI constituted a request for the
district court to also “redline” the challenged information, Marshall may still seek such relief
from the court. See State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 296-297, 178 P.3d 658, 661-662 (Ct. App.
2007) (distinguishing State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 262, 971 P.2d 327 (1988) by noting that in
Rodriguez, the district court had the power to send a corrected PSI to the Department of
Correction even after sentencing, and even after the Department of Correction had already
received the PSI, because Rodriguez has “utilized the correct procedure (i.e., objecting at
sentencing.”)).
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not ultimately tried or convicted were not inaccurate, unfounded, or unreliable, and thus the court
had no duty to remove this information.
A district court is free to consider the results and contents of a PSI if the reliability of the
information is ensured by the defendant’s opportunity to review the report, present favorable
evidence, and explain or rebut adverse information. Molen, 148 Idaho at 961, 231 P.3d at 1058.
When a district court rejects information in the PSI as inaccurate, unfounded, or unreliable, the
court should not merely disregard the information at sentencing, but also redline the information
from the PSI so that it does not prejudice the defendant in the future. State v. Carey, 152 Idaho
720, 722, 274 P.3d 21, 24 (2012); see also Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 263-264, 971 P.2d at 329330; Molen, 148 Idaho at 961-962, 231 P.3d at 1058-1059. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 181-184, 824
P.2d at 112-115.
However, a party is not entitled to have whichever information it objects to stricken from
a PSI. See Carey, 152 Idaho at 722-723, 274 P.3d at 23-24. In Carey, the Idaho Court of
Appeals reviewed a claim that the district court abused its discretion by failing to rule on Carey’s
objections to the PSI and failing to strike those challenged portions. Id. at 721, 274 P.3d at 22.
Carey argued that “because he rebutted or disputed these statements, they should have been
stricken from the PSI.” Id. at 722, 274 P.3d at 23. The Court rejected Carey’s argument and
recognized that a district court has a duty to redline the PSI only when it finds the disputed
portions to be speculative, inaccurate, or unreliable. Id. The Court of Appeals determined that
Carey failed to show “that any of the information to which he objected or which he rebutted was

7

found to be unreliable or inaccurate by the trial court.” Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that
Carey failed to show that the district court abused its discretion. Id. at 723, 274 P.3d at 24.
In this case, even if the district court accepted Marshall’s “correction” regarding the
reference to other victims in the PSI, the court had no duty to additionally strike this information
from the PSI for two reasons. First, Marshall never asked the court to do so. Second, (and even
if Marshall’s existing request constituted a request to strike the information), Marshall cannot
show that “any of the information to which he objected or which he rebutted was found to be
unreliable or inaccurate by the trial court.” Id. at 722, 274 P.3d at 23. The district court did not
make such a conclusion, and in fact, none of the challenged information was unreliable or
inaccurate.
While Marshall was ultimately tried only on charges involving property belonging to
inmate Augustin Amaral, the jail staff’s investigation revealed that there were two other victims
of Paula Rush’s wrongful acquisition of inmate property, and a third intended victim. (PSI, pp.45.) The investigation further revealed that Marshall had participated in this wrongful acquisition
of property by: (1) fraudulently filling out an inmate property release form; (2) instructing
another inmate to alter an inmate property release form to change the authorized recipient; (3)
speaking with Rush and telling her what to do with the inmate property after each instance of
Rush obtaining property at the jail; and (4) warning Rush that jail staff was investigating the
situation and that she should return certain property that she had taken. (Id.)
Notably, Marshall did not challenge the reliability of any of the information contained in
the PSI’s “Official Version” of the underlying investigation and of Marshall’s conduct, including

8

the conduct for which he was not tried and convicted. The PSI’s subsequent mere reference to
the other victims identified by the investigation was likewise not unreliable or otherwise
erroneous. The PSI did not state that Marshall had been convicted of crimes involving these
other individuals. Further, the PSI correctly indicated that most of the originally-brought felony
charges were ultimately dismissed. (PSI, pp.10-11.)
Finally, information about such incidents and conduct that do not result in criminal
convictions may appropriately be considered by district court, and thus may appropriately be
included in a PSI. See State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 926, 854 P.2d 265, 269 (Ct. App. 1993)
(A sentencing court “may consider hearsay evidence, evidence of previously dismissed charges
against the defendant, or evidence of charges which have not yet been proved, so long as the
defendant has the opportunity to object to, or to rebut, the evidence of his alleged misconduct.”)
(citations omitted); Fodge v. State, 125 Idaho 882, 885, 876 P.2d 164, 167 (Ct. App. 1994) (“The
latitude of the district court in admitting various types of evidence is far greater in sentencing
than at trial.”) (citing Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)).
The district court had no duty to redline the challenged information in the PSI because
Marshall did not ask it to do so; because the district court never found that the information was
unreliable; and because the information was not, in fact, unreliable or otherwise erroneously
included in the PSI. Marshall has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion.

9

II.
Marshall Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Marshall contends that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive

aggregate sentence upon the jury trial verdicts finding him guilty of aiding and abetting burglary
and aiding and abetting grand theft. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-9.) Specifically, though the district
court chose to retain jurisdiction, Marshall contends that the court abused its discretion by not
imposing shorter underlying sentences. (Id.) Marshall cannot show he is entitled to relief
because he has failed to establish that the district court’s unified 10-year sentence with three
years fixed for burglary, and its consecutive five-year indeterminate sentence for grand theft,
were excessive considering the objectives of sentencing, Marshall’s extensive history of theft and
consistent failures on parole and community supervision, the nature of the crimes, and other
factors before the court.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review only for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). The
appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the sentencing court abused its discretion. Id.

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is excessive. Id. To establish that his
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aggregate sentence is excessive, Marshall must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. -Id.; --see --also ---------State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650
P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982) (setting forth these sentencing objectives).
In this case, prior to imposing its sentence, the district court expressly noted that it had
considered the guidelines set forth by the statues and the appropriate sentencing goals, and that it
had “gone closely” through the materials that it received. (Sent. Tr., p.50, Ls.11-15.) The court
further expressly acknowledged the mitigating factors, and that Marshall was “at least starting to
make some changes that are proactive and prosocial in our society.” (Sent. Tr., p.50, Ls.21-23.)
Ultimately, the district court followed the state’s recommendations with respect to the fixed and
indeterminate terms of incarceration, but, rather than impose the sentences as the state
recommended, decided to retain jurisdiction. (Sent. Tr., p.51, L.11 – p.52, L.3.) A review of the
record supports the district court’s sentencing determination.
As the district court noted (Sent. Tr., p.50, Ls.18-20), Marshall has an extensive history of
theft- and property-based criminal offenses. Marshall,

at the time the

PSI was compiled, had, prior to the present case, three convictions for burglary, three convictions
for petit theft, and convictions for grand theft, willful concealment, malicious injury to property,
and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent. (PSI, pp.6-11.)
In this case, as the district court also noted (Sent Tr., p.50, L.24 – p.51, L.2), Marshall’s
crimes were particularly repugnant in that they exploited a vulnerable jail population whose
direct property ownership was already severely regulated, and who thus relies upon jail

11

administrative systems (systems which Marshall interfered with), simply to transfer property to
others outside of the jail. During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor also represented to the
court that Amaral, and the other victims whose cases were dismissed prior to trial, were all on
immigration holds, making them particularly vulnerable to the scheme. (Sent. Tr., p.42, Ls.518.)
The PSI also indicates that Marshall has repeatedly failed to comply with the rules of
probation and parole when he was granted those opportunities following prior convictions. (PSI,
pp.12-13, 26.) In 2008, Marshall violated his grand theft probation by committing a new
burglary offense, moving without permission, and failing to obtain a substance evaluation,
among other violations. (PSI, p.12.) After participating in the rider program in that case,
Marshall again violated his probation, which was then revoked. (Id.) After being granted parole
in 2016 in another case, Marshall violated the terms of his parole by using methamphetamine,
missing required appointments, and getting arrested on new felony charges. (PSI, pp.12-13.)
Marshall was on parole for felony burglary and in county jail on a new felony grand theft charge
at the time of the current offenses. (PSI, pp.26-27.)
In addition to committing felony offenses while incarcerated, Marshall has also had other
disciplinary issues in prison. While in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction,
Marshall received disciplinary offense reports for destruction of property, failure to comply with
a disciplinary sanction, battery, harassment, and other offenses. (PSI, p.13.) He was also
terminated from a prison kitchen job for taking extra food (PSI, p.20), and admitted using
methamphetamine while incarcerated (PSI, p.22). Marshall’s LSI-R score of 31 indicated he was
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a high-risk to re-offend. (PSI. p.24.) The presentence investigator, like the state, recommended
that the district court impose a term of incarceration. (PSI, p.27.)
Despite all of this, the district court chose not to follow the recommendation of the state
and PSI investigator to impose a prison sentence at that time, and instead elected to retain
jurisdiction and preserve an opportunity for Marshall to be placed on probation at the conclusion
of that period of retained jurisdiction. (Sent. Tr., p.51, L.11 – p.52, L.3.) The court found that
even though this case was not, at that moment, a “probation case,” “rehabilitation is appropriate,”
and that the period of retained jurisdiction would give Marshall “the best chance at rehabilitation
that [the court] can give [him].” (Sent Tr., p.51, L.11 – p.52, L.12.) The court concluded that
“[i]t would be my hope[5] to place you on probation.” (Sent. Tr., p.52, Ls.6-7.) Making a
sentencing determination that provided Marshall this opportunity for probation, but which also
included greater potential consequences should he fail as he had in the past, was appropriate in
light of all of the factors discussed above.
The district court’s unified 10-year sentence with three years fixed for aiding and abetting
burglary, and its consecutive five-year indeterminate sentence for aiding and abetting grand theft,
were both entirely reasonable considering the objectives of sentencing, Marshall’s criminal
history, the nature of Marshall’s crimes, and other factors before the court.

Marshall has

therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

5

At the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction in this case, the court did in fact place
Marshall on probation. See iCourt Portal, State v. Marshall, Canyon County District Court Case
No. CR14-18-03848.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of conviction entered
upon the trial court’s guilty verdicts.
DATED this 12th day of May, 2020.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of May, 2020, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/dd
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